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Abstract
In June, 2019, Japan submitted its mid-century strategy to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and 
pledged 80% emissions cuts by 2050. The strategy has not gone through a systematic analysis, however. The present study, 
Stanford Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) 35 Japan Model Intercomparison project (JMIP), employs five energy-economic 
and integrated assessment models to evaluate the nationally determined contribution and mid-century strategy of Japan. 
EMF 35 JMIP conducts a suite of sensitivity analyses on dimensions including emissions constraints, technology availability, 
and demand projections. The results confirm that Japan needs to deploy all of its mitigation strategies at a substantial scale, 
including energy efficiency, electricity decarbonization, and end-use electrification. Moreover, they suggest that with the 
absence of structural changes in the economy, heavy industries will be one of the hardest to decarbonize. Partitioning of 
the sum of squares based on a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) reconfirms that mitigation strategies, such as energy 
efficiency and electrification, are fairly robust across models and scenarios, but that the cost metrics are uncertain. There is 
a wide gap of policy strength and breadth between the current policy instruments and those suggested by the models. Japan 
should strengthen its climate action in all aspects of society and economy to achieve its long-term target.
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Introduction
In accordance with Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, the 
Government of Japan submitted its long-term low green-
house gas emission development strategy (or mid-century 
strategy) to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
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Climate Change (UNFCCC) in June 2019 (Government of 
Japan 2019). The strategy mentioned Japan’s goal of reduc-
ing greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050, which was 
stated in an earlier document (Ministry of the Environment 
2012; Government of Japan 2016). Recently, in October 
2020, Prime Minister Suga made a pledge to net-zero emis-
sions by 2050 (Suga 2020). However, it is not immediately 
clear how Japan could achieve deep decarbonization while 
the consequences of and policy choices after the 2011 Fuku-
shima nuclear disaster still linger, including difficulties of 
nuclear restarts and the rise of coal-fired power.
Although the Japanese government has not formally 
conducted a quantitative analysis of the proposal, many 
studies have already examined long-term policy proposals, 
including economy-wide climate policies (Fujimori et al. 
2019; Kato and Kurosawa 2019; Oshiro et al. 2019; Sugiy-
ama et al. 2019). Other studies have analyzed power sector 
policies that feature the significant penetration of variable 
renewable energies (VREs) (Komiyama et al. 2015; Matsuo 
et al. 2018).
While these studies have advanced our understanding 
of the policy issues, they have not comprehensively ana-
lyzed all the relevant factors. An important factor that has 
not received enough attention is the inter-model uncertainty 
among energy-economic and integrated assessment models, 
which is crucial in informing the climate policy debate (Krey 
2014).
To address the issue of inter-model uncertainty, the Stan-
ford Energy Modeling Forum 35 (EMF) Japan Model Inter-
comparison Project (JMIP) is tasked with analyzing Japan’s 
climate policy with a multi-model framework. The present 
study extends a pilot study by Sugiyama et al. (2019) and 
explores uncertainties in policy, technology, demand, and 
import dimensions in a systematic manner.
In particular, this study asks the following research 
questions:
• (1) How do various types of uncertainties affect the cost, 
feasibility, and features (e.g., power generation mix) of 
Japan’s mitigation policy?
• (2) Is there a specific, robust pattern in Japan’s decarboni-
zation pathways that cuts across uncertainties? What is 
the policy implication, given the magnitude of uncertain-
ties?
Though our primary focus is on the 80% emissions reduc-
tion, we also discuss the implications for the net-zero target.
Some words on the definition of uncertainty are in order. 
There are many sources of uncertainties, including struc-
tural and parametric uncertainties. This paper classifies the 
source of uncertainties into those originating from scenario 
specification (inter-scenario uncertainty) and the remainder, 
model uncertainty, which encompasses both structural and 
unharmonized parametric uncertainties. This definition is 
methodological, not conceptual. This is also consistent with 
our statistical approach.
This paper lays out the scenario design and some key 
findings of the EMF 35 JMIP study. Detailed investigations 
into the role of variable renewables (Shiraki et al. 2021), 
end-use electrification (Sakamoto et al. 2021), and industrial 
mitigation (Ju et al. 2021) are presented in the companion 
papers in this special feature. They are further enriched by 
individual modeling papers in this special issue.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The “Policy 
and literature review” section presents a short summary of 
Japan’s climate policy and the modeling literature. Although 
our main focus is on modeling, we provide a fairly broad 
overview of Japan’s policy situation. The “Method” section 
describes the models used and the scenarios utilized. This 
is followed by the “Results” section, which presents the out-




This section gives a brief overview of Japan’s climate 
policies and places the present analysis in a wider context, 
given that the policymaking in Japan is quite different from 
the western countries (Sofer 2016) in that Japan’s climate 
policy has been mostly shaped by bureaucracies, and other 
stakeholders played a limited role (Kameyama 2016). This 
section is based on earlier reviews by Takase and Suzuki 
(2011), Kuramochi (2015), and Kuriyama et al. (2019). To 
understand the political economy aspects, see Kameyama 
(2016), Sofer (2016), and Trencher et al. (2019) and the ref-
erences therein. Kameyama (2016) chronicled the climate 
policy of Japan from 1980s until 2015, focusing on the role 
of premiership. Sofer (2016) gave a concise summary of the 
actors and their roles in Japan’s climate policy, contrasting 
Japan and the United States. Trencher et al. (2019) is cen-
tered around coal-fired power plants, for which Japan has 
been supporting domestic usage and exports. The review 
here focuses on the central government and does not cover 
sub-national or non-state actors.
Japan’s climate policy was based mainly on energy effi-
ciency measures, such as Top-Runner Programs (Inoue 
and Matsumoto 2019) and building codes and labeling 
(Murakami et al. 2009; MLIT 2016), and voluntary actions 
taken by the industry (Keidanren 2013, 2019; Wakabayashi 
2013; Wakabayashi and Arimura 2016). These are mainly 
under the remit of the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and 
Industry (METI). Though they are so called, voluntary 
action plans go through formal reviews by expert committees 
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that are set up by the government. In particular, the Kyoto 
Protocol Target Achievement Plan formalized the review 
during the Protocol’s first commitment period. With regard 
to the promotion of lifestyle changes, the Ministry of the 
Environment has pushed for information campaigns, such 
as Cool Biz (since 2005). This campaign proved to be more 
extensive than its counterparts in other countries (Shove and 
Granier 2018).
Conversely, Japan has not been enthusiastic about price 
instruments. Overall, carbon pricing (both explicit and 
implicit) has been relatively weak in Japan (Ramstein et al. 
2019). The fossil fuel tax, namely chikyu ondanka taisaku 
zei (tax for global warming countermeasures), stands at 289 
JPY/t-CO2 or about 3 USD/t-CO2 (Ministry of the Environ-
ment 2020, partly because of a competitiveness concern for 
the industry. It is important to recognize that transport fuels 
have been taxed already at a high level. At the prefectural 
level, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government and Saitama Pre-
fectural Government have been implementing an emissions 
trading scheme (ETS) for the commercial sector (Arimura 
and Abe 2020). The Tokyo ETS was successful during Phase 
1 (2010–2014). A remarkable 25% reduction in carbon diox-
ide  (CO2) emissions was partly attributable to the carbon 
price signal but also assisted by the energy savings after 
the 2011 energy crisis and the effect of an advisory system 
(Wakabayashi and Kimura 2018; Arimura and Abe 2020).
Currently, the electricity sector is going through rapid 
changes, including the retail deregulation of 2016, the 
unbundling of utilities in 2020, and new market frameworks 
(i.e., baseload, flexibility, non-fossil value, and capacity) 
(Hattori 2019). Compared to countries like Germany, Japan 
had a slow start in its transition to renewables (Cherp et al. 
2017). The 2011 feed-in tariff (FIT) scheme helped in the 
growth of renewables. In particular, solar photovoltaics rose 
from 0.4% of Japan’s power generation in FY2011 to 6% 
in FY2018 (ANRE 2020a). However, the FIT also led to a 
gargantuan price tag of trillions of yen per year. The gov-
ernment is currently transitioning from the FIT scheme to a 
feed-in premium scheme and energy auctions to address the 
cost issue (Calculation Committee for Procurement Price, 
etc. 2020). Shiraki et al. (2021) in this issue reviews power 
sector policy development more fully.
However, Japan’s energy sector has not been fundamen-
tally altered despite a series of reforms in energy policies 
after the 2011 nuclear disaster, because it is dictated by 
resource constraints and broader economic conditions. Japan 
has a relatively small renewable resource base compared 
to its electricity demand (Luderer et al. 2017) because of 
its high population density, and the costs of renewables are 
higher than those in other countries (IRENA 2019; Calcula-
tion Committee for Procurement Price, etc. 2020). Unlike 
many of Western countries, Japan retains a large presence 
of heavy industry. However, as the industry sector is one 
of hardest to decarbonize (Davis et al. 2018; Luderer et al. 
2018) and innovative technologies have not been developed 
sufficiently (Ju et al. 2021), industrial mitigation presents a 
significant challenge for Japan.
Quantitative policy targets
In the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol 
(2008–2012), Japan honored its commitment to reduce 
emissions by 6% from the 1990 levels by reducing domestic 
emissions and purchasing credits from abroad (Ministry of 
the Environment 2014). In June 2009, the Aso administra-
tion announced a mid-term target of 15% emissions reduc-
tion by 2020 relative to the 2005 levels (8% reduction rela-
tive to the 1990 levels) (Prime Minister’s Office 2009). A 
significant modeling exercise (as part of a policy process) 
was conducted in preparation for this target (Fukui 2009). 
In September 2009, however, the newly elected, Hatoyama 
administration of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 
announced its ambition to reduce its emissions by 25% by 
2020 relative to the 1990 levels (33% reduction relative to 
the 2005 levels) (Copenhagen Pledge), but this plan required 
a significant expansion of nuclear power fleets (Duffield and 
Woodall 2011). The pledge was overturned after the 2011 
Great Eastern Japan Earthquake, tsunamis, and the Fuku-
shima Daiichi nuclear disaster. The DPJ contemplated an 
alternative energy path without relying on nuclear power. 
However, it lost to a coalition of the Liberal Democratic 
Party and Komeito in the 2012 election. Japan did not take 
part in the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Furthermore, it downgraded its 2020 pledge to 3.8% emis-
sions reduction relative to the 2005 levels under the prospect 
of limited nuclear operation (Warsaw Target) (Ministry of 
the Environment 2013).
In the run-up to the COP21 in Paris, the Abe administra-
tion, which won the 2012 election, submitted its Intended 
Nationally Determined Contribution to the UNFCCC. 
Herein, Japan committed to reduce its emissions by 26% by 
FY20301 from the FY 2013 levels (Government of Japan 
2015). In the following year, the Cabinet approved the Plan 
for Global Warming Countermeasure, which included a goal 
to reduce emissions by 80% by 2050 (Government of Japan 
2016). In 2019, the Government of Japan (2019) decided on 
its mid-century strategy and reiterated the 80% emissions 
reduction goal. In March 2020, in the 5-year update cycle of 
mitigation policies, Japan retained the formerly announced 
targets (Government of Japan 2020). Most recently, in Octo-
ber 2020, Prime Minster Suga made a pledge of net-zero 
emissions by 2050 in his inaugural speech in the parliament.




One topic of contention in Japan’s target is the choice of 
the reference year (Kuramochi 2015). The most significant is 
with respect to the Warsaw target such that a 3.8% reduction 
from the 2005 levels translates into a 3.1% increase from the 
1990 levels. The reference year for the mid-century strategy 
had not yet been decided; this no longer matters since the 
government pledged a net-zero target (Fig. 1).
Another key feature of Japan’s long-term policy is that it 
is associated with a detailed emissions sectoral breakdown 
and energy mix (Fig. 2). Moreover, these numbers are not 
merely indicative targets but serve as concrete goals in policy 
discussions. For instance, under the nationally determined 
contribution (NDC), 22–24% of electricity is to be supplied 
by renewables, and there is an additional detailed break-
down for individual renewable technologies. Another con-
tentious issue is the role of nuclear power, which is assumed 
to account for 20–22%. Although restarting nuclear power 
plants has been slow and only six units are operational as of 
April 20, 2020 (ANRE 2020b), the detailed breakdown of 
the power generation mix has not been revised during the 
update of the Strategic Energy Plan in 2018 (ANRE 2018). 
There are high expectations for an improvement in energy 
intensity of GDP with an annual improvement rate of 2.1% 
per year for 2014–2030, although the observed rate was 
Fig. 1  Historical GHG emis-
sions, and 2020, 2030, and 
2050 targets. Data are from 
(UNFCCC 2020). Note that the 
2020 target is based on a strong 
assumption of no mitigation 
contribution from nuclear power
−3.6% from 2005 by 2020


























Fig. 2  Power generation mix for 
FY2010 and FY2018 (actual), 
the 2030 target plans accord-
ing to the 2010 (ANRE 2010), 
2012 (Energy and Environmen-
tal Council 2012) and 2015 
(METI 2015) plans. The 2030 
(FY2010) plan corresponds to 
the Saidai Dounyu (maximum 
deployment) case. The 2030 














































1.6% per year for 2000–2015. This could be the result of a 
high growth projection of gross domestic product (GDP), 
however (Kuriyama et al. 2019).
Mid‑century strategy
In contrast to the 2030 target, Japan’s 2050 policy document 
is vague with respect to numerous concrete issues (Gov-
ernment of Japan 2019). For instance, it does not specify 
the reference year or demonstrate any specific pathway to 
achieve the 80% emission reduction goal. Nonetheless, it 
mentions certain notable points. The Fifth Strategic Energy 
Plan (ANRE 2018) also provides useful information.
First, the long-term strategy and the Strategic Energy 
Plan states “multi-track scenarios” or pluralistic perspec-
tives on scenarios, and in particular, technology develop-
ment. This approach is in contrast to the Japanese approach 
with respect to the 2030 target, for which the government 
has allocated emissions reduction to each technology. Sec-
ond, both documents place significant emphasis on the role 
of technological innovations in achieving the long-term goal, 
with the long-term strategy touting a virtuous cycle between 
economic growth and mitigation. Furthermore, it mentions 
the link with related innovation strategies the government 
has already formulated. Lastly, the Strategic Energy Plan 
proposes a scientific review mechanism through which the 
government periodically reviews progress toward the tran-
sition to a clean energy system. This point has not been 
emphasized in the long-term strategy. It is not clear how 
modeling studies, such as the present one, could contribute 
to this proposed review mechanism.
Modeling: single‑model studies
Many studies have focused on economy-wide, long-term cli-
mate change mitigation for Japan up to 2050. These can be 
classified into (1) single-model studies and (2) multi-model 
studies. For sectoral-level reviews, please refer to the com-
panion papers (Ju et al. 2021; Sakamoto et al. 2021; Shiraki 
et al. 2021).
For single-model studies, Kainuma et al. (2015) used the 
AIM/Enduse energy systems model to analyze the impli-
cations of 80% emissions reduction by 2050. Oshiro et al. 
(2018) employed AIM/Enduse to analyze net zero emissions 
of  CO2 by 2050, and found the importance of bioenergy with 
carbon capture and storage (BECCS). In a similar vein, Kato 
and Kurosawa (2019) examined 2050 emissions reduction 
of 80% and more, and found that reduced service demands 
and the availability of BECCS would be vital to achieve 
90% emissions reduction. Schreyer et al. (2020) used the 
ReMIND model to compare 2050 net-zero targets for Aus-
tralia, the European Union, Japan, and the United States, 
and found a smaller share of variable renewables in Japan 
because of its high population density.
Modeling: multi‑model studies
Among multi-model studies in Japan, the earlier ones were 
part of the government-led policy process. In recent years, 
we have seen an increasing number of academic studies, 
including our pilot phase research (Sugiyama et al. 2019).
Government-led efforts include the Mid-Term Target 
Evaluation Committee (Chuki Mokuhyo Kento Iinkai) (Fukui 
2009) and the Energy and Environmental Council (2012) 
(Enerugi Kankyo Kaigi). Both exercises were conducted 
as part of the policymaking process with town hall meet-
ings and deliberative polls. They mainly analyzed six and 
three scenarios, respectively. The former analyzed differ-
ent emissions reduction levels and policy packages, and the 
(modified) middle option out of the six was eventually cho-
sen. The latter focused on different levels of nuclear power 
generation, and the zero nuclear case was finally selected. 
Unfortunately, these model inter-comparison results were 
not published in the academic literature, unlike the EMF 
studies in the United States (Fawcett et al. 2014) or Europe 
(Knopf et al. 2013).
In the academic literature, one of the recurring themes is 
the high marginal abatement costs in Japan. A five-model 
study by Hanaoka and Kainuma (2012) examined medium-
term (2020 and 2030) marginal costs of abatement but did 
not focus on emissions pathways. The Asian Modeling Exer-
cise (AME) (Calvin et al. 2012) implemented scenarios of 
idealized carbon prices and globally coordinated scenarios, 
in which four models from Japan participated. Aldy et al. 
(2016) contrasted the marginal cost of Japan against those 
from other parts of the world. Our pilot study (Sugiyama 
et al. 2019) compared the cost of 80% emissions reduction 
by 2050 in Japan against those in the United States and 
Europe. These four studies revealed that the marginal cost 
in Japan is higher than that in other countries.
As part of the EU-funded MILES project, Akimoto et al. 
(2015) used DNE21 + and AIM/Enduse models to analyze 
the intended NDC of Japan. For the EU-funded CD-Links 
project, Oshiro et al. (2019) compared global IAM results 
against two, national models (AIM/Enduse [Japan] and 
DNE21 + (national)), and demonstrated that Japan’s goal of 
80% emissions reduction is consistent with cost-effective 
pathways for the 2-degree target, but not with the 1.5-degree 
target.
Although these studies are of crucial importance, they 
do not fully characterize the inter-model uncertainty in 
assessing the 2050 target, including technology availability 
(Clarke et al. 2014a). For instance, in the wake of the Fuku-
shima nuclear disaster, more attention has been paid to the 
future of power generation mix, and the costs of bringing 
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about a desired mix. And yet, it is well known (at least at the 
global scale) that such a power mix is subject to enormous 
uncertainty.
Moreover, the inter-model uncertainty interacts with 
other sources of uncertainty. Sugiyama et al. (2019) con-
ducted an initial assessment of inter-model uncertainty, but 
did not fully consider other types of uncertainty, including 
policy stringency, technological availability, service demand 
reduction, and import prices. To address these issues, the 
present study conducts a multi-model assessment of Japan’s 
long-term climate policy under varying future scenarios.
Method
Models
Five energy-economic and integrated assessment models are 
used in the present study: AIM/Hub-Japan, AIM/Enduse-
Japan, DNE21, IEEJ_Japan 2017, and TIMES-Japan. 
(DNE21 should not be taken for DNE21 +, which is a dif-
ferent model.) These differ in model type, regional aggrega-
tion level and technological representation. As shown below, 
using a variety of models leads to a wide range of assess-
ment results, confirming the usefulness of the analysis of 
inter-model uncertainty.
Table 1 shows the summary of models used in the present 
study. A detailed description of each model can be found 
in the Electronic Supplementary Material (ESM) (“Model 
descriptions”).
Some models cover multiple greenhouse gases, but this 
study focuses on  CO2 emissions from energy use and indus-
trial processes.
Scenarios
The scenario design of this study examines four dimensions 
of uncertainty (Table 2):
• emissions constraint stringency;
• technological sensitivity;
• service demand levels; and
• energy import prices.
The detailed scenario descriptions are given in the ESM 
(“Scenario descriptions”). Unlike previous EMF studies 
(e.g., EMF 27) (Kriegler et al. 2014), we did not combine 
variations in different dimensions to produce a scenario 
matrix since in our case, the number of scenarios would 
have been prohibitively large.
The name of each scenario is denoted as (policy dimen-
sion)_(other parameter settings). (policy dimension) takes 
the format of either “Baseline” or “(xx)by30 + (yy)by50”, 
which stipulates xx% reduction by 2030 and yy% reduction 
by 2050. The main scenarios of our study are as follows:
• Baseline_Def: no climate policy2 assumed with default 
parameter settings:
• 26by30 + 80by50_Def: each model imposes Japan’s 
NDC (26% emissions reduction by FY2030 relative to 
the FY2013 levels) and mid-century strategy (80% emis-
sions reduction by 2050).
The different levels of emission constraints are ana-
lyzed to explore the implications of the over- and 
Table 1  Participating energy-economic and integrated assessment models to assess the climate policies in Japan
AIM/Hub-Japan is a computable general equilibrium model while AIM/Enduse-Japan is a bottom-up, technology-rich model
Model Coverage Institute Model type Representative reference (see 
ESM for fuller descriptions)
AIM/Enduse-Japan V2.1 National Kyoto University and National 
Institute for Environmental Studies 
(NIES, Japan)
Recursive dynamic, partial equilib-
rium
Oshiro and Masui (2015)
AIM/Hub-Japan 2.1 National Kyoto University, National Institute 
for Environmental Studies (NIES, 
Japan) and Institute for Global 
Environmental Strategies (IGES)
Recursive dynamic, general equi-
librium
Fujimori et al. (2017)
DNE21 Version 1.3 Global The University of Tokyo (UTokyo) Perfect foresight, partial equilibrium Fujii et al. (2015)
IEEJ Japan ver. 2017 National Institute of Energy Economics, 
Japan (IEEJ)
Perfect foresight, partial equilibrium Matsuo et al. (2013)
TIMES-Japan 3.1 National The Institute of Applied Energy 
(IAE), Japan
Perfect foresight, partial equilibrium Kato and Kurosawa (2019)




under-achievement of current policies. This is also useful 
to inform the ratchet-up mechanism in the Paris Agree-
ment, though the Government of Japan has already submit-
ted its updated NDC in March without revising its goal for 
2030 (Government of Japan 2020).
The technology sensitivity analysis follows previous 
EMF studies (Knopf et al. 2013; Clarke et al. 2014a; Fawc-
ett et al. 2014) and analyzes the impacts of the availability 
of various technological options in an idealized manner. 
In addition, this study looks at renewables and systems 
integration (including energy storage). As nuclear power is 
such a divisive issue, we consider three nuclear scenarios: 
model default, limited nuclear, and no nuclear. Availabil-
ity of a technological option is affected by technological 
development, public acceptance, or both.
Energy service demands are an important factor in 
determining the mitigation challenges (Fujimori et  al. 
2014; Grubler et al. 2018; Kuriyama et al. 2019). Our 
scenario design includes idealized sensitivity analyses to 
reduce the service demands by half in each of the three 
sectors (industry, transport, and buildings), besides a sce-
nario with lower economic growth rate. Although we treat 
them as idealized scenarios, a myriad of factors can induce 
changes in service demands, including a sudden demand 
shock, such as the 2019–2021 outbreak of the novel coro-
navirus and improvements in material efficiency.
Japan relies heavily on energy imports with a self-suf-
ficiency rate of less than 10% (ANRE 2019). Even after 
transitioning to a clean energy system, Japan may continue 
to rely on imports. Currently the government is exploring 
the possibility of importing a significant amount of hydro-
gen (Ministerial Council on Renewable Energy, Hydrogen 
and Related Issues 2017) from countries, such as Australia 
(Ozawa et al. 2017). It is therefore useful to examine the 
sensitivity to energy import price changes.
Harmonization of GDP and population
In previous EMF studies, it was a standard practice to not 
harmonize basic input assumptions. While this approach is 
useful in characterizing variations in such parameters, an 
alternative strategy involves harmonizing basic inputs so that 
the analysis can focus on model structures and more detailed 
technical parameters. In this study, we harmonize gross 
domestic product (GDP) and population, two key drivers of 
energy consumption and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
Population data were adopted from (IPSS 2017). We 
assume two GDP growth scenarios. The high growth sce-
nario uses data on the growth rate till 2030 from the gov-
ernment’s Long-Term Energy Outlook, and selects the 
2030–2050 growth rates, from the Shared Socioeconomic 
Pathway (SSP) 2 (Dellink et al. 2017). The low growth 
Table 2  Description of EMF 35 JMIP scenarios
Only policy scenarios are shown for brevity. Note that baseline scenarios are denoted as Baseline_Def, etc. See the ESM Scenario Descriptions 
for more details
There are some differences in the implementation of scenarios in each model. For instance, for the LoVREcost scenario, some models imple-
mented the VRE cost reduction from the beginning of the calculation period while others reduced the cost in a linear schedule
Dimension Scenarios Notes






NDC and mid-century strategy
NDC and 70% reduction by 2050
NDC and 90% reduction by 2050
NDC and 100% reduction by 2050
16% reduction by 2030 and mid-century strategy
36% reduction by 2030 and mid-century strategy










No carbon capture and storage (CCS) is available
Only limited deployment of nuclear is allowed
Nuclear power is not available
High challenges of renewables system integration
Low challenges of renewables system integration
The costs of renewables are halved
The costs of renewables are doubled
The potentials of renewables are halved
The potentials of renewables are doubled
The cost of energy storage is greatly reduced




A lower GDP scenario is applied
Lower GDP and demands halved for buildings
Lower GDP and demands halved for transport
Lower GDP and demands halved for industry
Energy import prices 26by30 + 80by50_HiImportCost Energy import prices are doubled
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scenario presumes the SSP 2 growth rate throughout. Sce-
narios with “LoDem”, “LoDemInd”, “LoDemBld”, and 
“LoDemTra” also have a low GDP growth rate. Although 
we consider only one population scenario and two GDP 
scenarios, service demand sensitivity scenarios provide an 
opportunity to explore the impact of drivers in an idealized 
manner. Further details are provided in the ESM Scenario 
Descriptions. The scenario submission status is summarized 
in Table ESM 4.
Decomposition of variance (sum of squares)
Our rich dataset is underlined by five models and 38 scenario 
settings. To identify robust areas and uncertain domains, we 
compare the variance of the normalized value of each vari-
able and decompose the variance.
Specifically, we partition the sum of squares of a two-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) model (NIST/SEMATECH 
2013; Takakura et al. 2019):
(1)ym,s =  + m + s + m,s + m,s,
where y is a generic, normalized model variable for a certain 
period, the subscripts s, and m denote scenarios and models, 
respectively.  is the mean response. m and s represent the 
main effect of model and scenario, respectively. m,s is the 
interaction term, and m,s is the residual term. To compare 
across variables, we restrict ourselves to mitigation scenar-
ios with the NDC and mid-century strategy (scenario name 
starting with 26by30 + 80by50), and normalize all variables 
by its mean across scenarios and models.
The sum of squares can be decomposed as
where  SStotal is the total sum of squares 
∑
m,s (ym,s − ȳ)
2 , with 
the bar denoting the pooled mean.  SSm,  SSs, and  SSi repre-
sent the sums of squares attributable to models, scenarios, 
and interactions, respectively.
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Fig. 3  Drivers [population (upper left) and economic growth (upper right)], final energy (lower left), and  CO2 emissions (lower right) from 




First, we focus on selected scenarios (emissions constraints 
of the NDC and mid-century strategy) to highlight key fea-
tures and explore the parameter sensitivities of no nuclear 
power, no carbon capture and storage (CCS), and lower GDP 
growth. The choice of this set is motivated by the following 
considerations. First, nuclear power remains a contentious 
political issue. Second, CCS is often considered to be a key 
enabler of deep decarbonization (Kriegler et al. 2014; Clarke 
et al. 2014a). Third, there is criticism against the government 
projection of GDP (Kuriyama et al. 2019). As shown below, 
these factors have a large impact on policy costs.
Figure 3 presents the time series of the two key driv-
ers (population and gross domestic product or GDP), total 
final energy consumption, and  CO2 emissions from energy 
use and industrial processes for the baseline and NDC and 
mid-century strategy scenario (for other scenarios, see Fig. 
ESM 1). Although the population is projected to decrease by 
19% from 2020 to 2050, the Japanese economy is assumed 
to grow by approximately 30% over the same timeframe. 
There is a significant variation in final energy and emis-
sions in the baseline scenario, which reconfirms the need 
for model inter-comparison. The IEEJ_Japan 2017 model 
shows a baseline emissions trajectory that is similar to the 
policy case (26by30 + 80by50_Def) because of assumed 
energy efficiency trends. Emissions in the base year from 
AIM/Hub-Japan are different from those of other models 
because of the use of a different database (see the ESM sec-
tion Energy data sources and model treatment).
Figure 4 disaggregates emissions reduction into differ-
ent sectors, thereby demonstrating how Japan can reduce 
its own emissions by 2050. There is a difference between 
the partial equilibrium and general equilibrium models. 
The former chooses almost complete decarbonization of 
the power and transport sectors by 2050, whereas there are 
some differences in the buildings sector. The industry emis-
sion is the most difficult to abate, as shown in our previous 
research (Sugiyama et al. 2019). On the other hand, AIM/
Hub-Japan, the only general equilibrium model, exhibits a 
significant emissions reduction for industry. In AIM/Hub-
Japan, the hardest sector to decarbonize is transportation. 
Figure 4 also displays the model range of emissions across 
scenarios, represented by ribbons. The cross-scenario range 
is dominated by the inter-model differences.
To understand the type of approaches used by models to 
achieve deep emissions cuts, Fig. 5 characterizes the key 



























































































































































































Fig. 4  Sectoral  CO2 emissions for the selected scenarios. The lines correspond to the 26by30 + 80by50_Def scenario. The ribbons represent the 
range of NoNuc, NoCCS, LoDem, and Def scenarios (the scenario prefix “26by30 + 80by50_” is dropped)
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26by30 + 80by50_Def represented by solid lines and other 
scenarios depicted by ribbons. The figure reveals that the 
options that are found to be useful in the global context are 
also effective in Japan: economy-wide energy efficiency 
(Clarke et al. 2014b; Sugiyama et al. 2014), power sector 
decarbonization (Clarke et al. 2014b; Krey et al. 2014), 
end-use electrification (Williams et al. 2012; Sugiyama 
2012; Krey et al. 2014), penetration of VREs (Luderer 
et al. 2014), and a shift away from fossil fuels (Krey et al. 
2014; IPCC 2018). Robustness varies by indicator. Energy 
efficiency and electricity decarbonization are most robust, 
and the electrification rate changes by model. The increas-
ing tendencies of VREs and non-fossil energy are robust 
but the magnitudes are uncertain. The share of industry in 
final energy consumption increases with time in the partial 
equilibrium models, a tendency consistent with Fig. 4.
Our focus is on the mid-century strategy (80% emis-
sions reduction), but we find that the same strategies 
are also effective in more stringent cases, though they 
are further strengthened (Fig. ESM 11). Note that the 
26by30 + 90by50_Def scenario is infeasible in two 
models, and the 26by30 + 100by50_Def in three models 
(Table ESM 4).
For electrification, AIM/Hub-Japan shows a higher rate 
than other models. The reason for this is due to high elec-
trification of the industry sector (Fig. ESM 2) (see Saka-
moto et al. 2021 for more on this). Also, the industry share 
of final energy decreases in AIM/Hub-Japan not because 
the industry final energy decreases more rapidly than in 
other models, but because the total final energy consump-
tion does not reduce as much as other partial equilibrium 
models (Fig. ESM 3).
On the basis of per-capita indicators, the median final 
energy consumption decreases by 11% from 2010 to 
2050, while the median value of electricity consumption 
increases by 43% (see Figures ESM 4 and 5).
There are some variations across scenarios in the share 
of VREs and fossil fuel shares, but they are not as large 
as the inter-model uncertainties. A large fossil fuel share 
found for DNE21 is from the NoNuc scenario, in which the 
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Fig. 5  Key indicators of decarbonization options: (top left) energy 
intensity of GDP, (top middle)  CO2 intensity of electricity, (top right) 
the share of electricity in final energy consumption, (bottom left) the 
share of solar and wind in secondary electricity, (bottom middle) 
share of fossil fuels in primary energy, and (bottom right) the share 
of the industry sector in total final energy consumption. The ribbons 
represent the ranges of NoNuc, NoCCS, LoDem, and Def scenarios 
(the scenario prefix “26by30 + 80by50_” is dropped).
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Another uncertain variable is the use of CCS. The median 
CCS sequestration is about 50 Mt-CO2/year in 2050, with 
the maximum amount being approximately 350Mt-CO2/year 
for AIM/Hub-Japan (Fig. ESM 5).
There is a discrepancy in the industry share of final 
energy consumption even in the base year. This is attributed 
to the difference in the database used among the partici-
pating models. The models use either the energy balance 
of the International Energy Agency or the comprehensive 
energy statistics compiled by METI. There are some differ-
ences between these two databases, and the variations are 
Fig. 6  Primary energy mix for the selected scenarios for 2030 (top) and 2050 (bottom)
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pronounced for the industry share (Aoshima 2008).3 See the 
ESM Energy data sources and model treatment for a fuller 
description.
Figures 6 and 7 describe the primary energy and power 
generation mixes for different scenarios for 2030 and 
2050. The ESM presents the compositions of energy and 
power generation in the baseline scenario, which are domi-
nated by fossil fuels (Fig. ESM 7 for 2010; Figs. ESM 8 
and 9 for 2030 and 2050, respectively). The penetration 
Fig. 7  Power generation mix in 2030 and 2050 for the selected scenarios. The “other” in AIM/Hub-Japan refers to power generation technolo-
gies, such as ocean, tidal, etc.
3 Whether blast furnace gas is counted in the energy conversion sec-
tor or the industry sector makes a non-negligible difference. This 
difference affects both the emissions and final energy, and hence the 
changes reported in this paper.
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of renewables is limited in the baseline scenario partly 
because of high costs.
In 2030, fossil fuels are still dominant, and clean energy 
sources greatly expand after then (Fig. 6). In 2050, the 
models exhibit differing primary energy supply levels. It is 
8EJ/year for IEEJ_Japan 2017 and 16EJ/year for AIM/Hub-
Japan. They also show different preferred mixes, with their 
mixes strongly reflecting model defaults, despite scenario 
influences. In the primary energy mix, oil and gas (often 
with CCS) continue to play an important role for all the 
models even in 2050, irrespective of scenarios. The sec-
ondary energy trade, which represents hydrogen imports, is 
projected to play an increasing role in IEEJ_Japan 2017 and 
TIMES-Japan. Note that both models incorporate domestic 
hydrogen production and imports, and that imports predomi-
nate because of cost considerations and renewable resource 
limitations for green hydrogen (see Sakamoto et al. 2021 
for more on this).
Power sector decarbonization accelerates significantly 
after 2030 (Fig. 7). The 2030 power generation mix should 
be compared with the official targets (Fig. 2) that fixes the 
share of nuclear power at around 20%. By design, our anal-
ysis considers a scenario without nuclear power, and the 
results include a power mix that is quite different from the 
official target.
As with total primary energy, total power generation var-
ies greatly across models. In 2050, it ranges from 0.9 PWh/
year in IEEJ_Japan 2017 to approximately 2.1 PWh/year in 
AIM/Hub-Japan. VREs expand greatly, with a median pene-
tration rate of 42% among the four models (AIM/Hub-Japan, 
AIM/Enduse-Japan, IEEJ_Japan 2017, and TIMES-Japan). 
The exception to this is DNE21, which prefers nuclear power 
(Shiraki et al. 2021). When CCS or nuclear power is not 
available, the gap is compensated for by other clean energy 
sources, but different models exhibit different preferred 
generation methods. For instance, in IEEJ_Japan 2017, the 
unavailability of nuclear power increases gas with CCS and 
wind, and hydrogen increases when CCS is not available. 
Nuclear power is replaced with biopower in TIMES-Japan, 
and the unavailability of CCS increases hydrogen. A large 
deployment of wind in AIM/Enduse-Japan and AIM/Hub-
Japan can be explained by larger wind resource potentials in 
these models (Shiraki et al. 2021).
Next, we characterize the costs of achieving deep emis-
sions reduction (Fig. 8) by examining marginal costs and 
total costs (consumption loss for AIM/Hub-Japan and 
additional total energy system cost for other bottom–up 
models). The carbon prices rise exponentially with time. 
The median price (2010USD/t-CO2) is 0 in 2020, 74 in 
2030, 144 in 2040, and 819 in 2050 for the main mitiga-
tion scenario (26by30 + 80by50_Def). In the case of the 
26by30 + 80by50_LoDem scenario, the median price is 0 
in 2020, 18 in 2030, 75 in 2040, and 709 in 2050.
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model E H D I TAIM/Enduse−Japan AIM/Hub−Japan DNE21 IEEJ_Japan 2017 TIMES−Japan
Fig. 8  Marginal cost and policy costs (energy system cost and consumption loss) for the selected mitigation scenarios. The ribbons correspond 
to the uncertainty range represented by the four scenarios of the 26by30 + 80by50 scenario variants: Def, NoNuc, NoCCS, and LoDem
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The values are sensitive to scenario assumptions. Though 
model fingerprints persist, the unavailability of CCS 
increases the marginal cost of mitigation in many models 
(Fig. ESM 10), leading to a wide range of uncertainty, as 
represented by ribbons. Total cost metrics are less sensitive. 
In 2050, the policy costs amount to approximately 3% of 
GDP for AIM/Hub-Japan, while other partial equilibrium 
models suggest 0.8–0.9% of GDP.
To compare the cost metrics in a more concise manner, 
Fig. 9 presents the average costs (both total and marginal) 
discounted at 5% for the period 2020–2050. The two most 
stringent scenarios (90% or 100% emissions reduction) are 
feasible only for AIM/Hub-Japan and DNE21. Total costs 
roughly scale linearly with stringency, whereas marginal 
costs increase exponentially. The inter-model uncertainty 
range is sizable for both metrics, but particularly large for 
marginal costs.
Sensitivity analysis of the parameter setting reveals that 
lower demand and availability of nuclear power and CCS aid 
in containing the costs. In terms of policy costs, as compared 
to CCS, nuclear power has a larger impact in all the models, 
except AIM/Hub-Japan. For marginal costs, AIM/Hub-Japan 
and AIM/Enduse-Japan suggest lower impacts due to the 
lack of nuclear power than CCS; the rest of the models point 
in a different direction.
We also examine the impacts of setting different 2030 
targets. Imposing a stricter target leads to higher costs in all 
the models, but AIM/Hub-Japan shows a nuanced behavior. 
In fact, the difference in the discounted carbon price between 
the 26by30 + 80by50_Def (99 2010USD/t-CO2) and 
36by30 + 80by50_Def (105 USD-tCO2) scenarios is small. 
This is because early action leads to a higher cost in an ear-
lier period but a lower cost in later periods. As the AIM/
Hub-Japan is a myopic model, an early mitigation action 
partially improves welfare in their modeling framework.
To assess the variability of each variable across mod-
els and scenarios, Fig.  10 presents the average carbon 
price discounted at 5%, normalized by its value for the 
26by30 + 80by50_Def scenario. Based on the behavior of 
the medians (triangle in the diagram), stringent emissions 
constraints (90% and 100% reduction by 2050) are most 
impactful in increasing the costs, followed by non-availa-
bility of CCS and nuclear power. This is followed by sensi-
tivity analyses on renewables and systems integration. Lower 
levels of demand can significantly reduce the costs, and the 
lowering of the industrial service demand reduces the cost 
substantially. Doubling the VRE potential and halving the 
VRE costs are also helpful in reducing the cost. High-energy 
import costs do not have a significant impact.
An analysis based on a two-way ANOVA model reveals 
both uncertain metrics (e.g., costs, the role of nuclear, 
CCS, and VREs) and robust indicators (e.g., economy-
wide energy efficiency, electrification). Figure 11 depicts 
the results of decomposition of the sum of squares of key 
variables, based on a two-way ANOVA model. Except for 























































































































































































































































Average costs discounted at 5%, 2020−2050
Fig. 9  Sensitivity of average cost metrics (discounted at 5%, over 
2020–2050) to scenario assumptions. Carbon price (left) and policy 
cost per GDP (right). Policy cost/GDP is defined as consumption loss 
per GDP loss for AIM/Hub-Japan and the additional total energy sys-





















































































































































Carbon Price averaged over 2020−2050 
at a discount rate of 5%
Fig. 10  Discounted averages of the normalized carbon price in each scenario. Discounting is over 2020–2050 at 5%. Normalization is conducted 
with the 26by30 + 80by50_Def value being unity. The model median for each scenario is represented by a triangle
Energy Intensity of GDP
Fossil Fuel Share
Industry Share in FE
Electrification Rate
Discounted Energy System Cost per GDP














ANOVA of 26by30+80by50 scenario variants
2050
Fig. 11  The sums of squares of the two-way ANOVA of each variable. The time period is 2050, except for cumulative variables. A discount rate 
of 5% is applied for discounted variables
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uncertainty, and inter-scenario variation plays a minor 
role. While CCS tops the list of the uncertainty among 
variables, all the cost metrics loom large because of model 
and scenario uncertainties. Both total and marginal cost 
metrics are sensitive, and scenario uncertainties are 
large, especially for the energy system cost. The shares of 
nuclear power and VREs are also susceptible to the choice 
of model and scenario. Besides reconfirming the findings 
of Figs. 5 and 11 clarifies where uncertainty prevails.
Note that the  CO2 intensity of electricity is close to zero 
and has been excluded from this analysis.
Discussion and conclusion
Summary of modeling results
The present study has identified robust mitigation strate-
gies that cut across models and scenarios. In spite of a 
diverse set of modeling frameworks, the models find econ-
omy-wide energy efficiency and electricity decarboniza-
tion to be the most robust. All the models find increasing 
trends of end-use electrification, deployment of VREs, and 
a shift away from fossil fuels, though the magnitudes vary 
among models. Partial equilibrium models also indicate 
that the residual emissions from the industry sector are 
difficult to abate. These are largely consistent with the lit-
erature and previous research (see the “Results”). Though 
not all models show feasible solutions for stringent policy 
scenarios (90% and 100% emissions reduction), the overall 
strategies remain the same and they are enhanced further.
Another robust feature is the stringency and cover-
age of future climate policy. The marginal cost or carbon 
price is set to increase rapidly. The 26by30 + 80by50_
Def scenario shows a median price of ~ 70 2010USD/t-
CO2 in 2030 and ~ 800 USD/t-CO2 in 2050, whereas the 
26by30 + 80by50_LoDem scenario exhibits a median price 
of ~ 18 USD/t-CO2 in 2030 and ~ 709 USD/t-CO2 in 2050. 
Accordingly, policies must be strengthened to meet Japan’s 
NDC and mid-century strategy goals. All the emission 
sectors must contribute to mitigation with an exponen-
tially rising marginal cost. In terms of the total cost, this 
translates into a 3% consumption loss per GDP for AIM/
Hub-Japan and an additional total energy system cost of 
0.8–0.9% of GDP for the partial equilibrium models in 
2050.
These models also suggest areas of uncertainty. One 
such area is the energy mix. The models reveal multiple 
energy futures that are economically efficient. Another 
uncertain aspect is the exact size of the cost, which 
depends on both the model and scenario assumption. 
Both marginal and total costs vary greatly by model and 
assumptions, such as technology availability, service 
demand levels, and policy stringency.
Policy implications
In the following, we provide the implications for policy 
based on our interpretation of modeling results.
The current mid-century strategy has not detailed any sec-
toral breakdown, and given the uncertainty in the industrial 
mitigation, policymakers should carefully design sectoral 
policies. On the other hand, power sector decarbonization is 
robust across models and scenarios. As discussed in the pol-
icy review section, the government has established a 2030 
target, but not for 2050. The government should clarify the 
overall, 2050 power sector target in the future policy.
The current study reveals an exponential rise in carbon 
prices. As reviewed in policy review, currently, the carbon 
tax of Japan stands at ~ 3 USD/t-CO2. While the effective 
price is higher in some sectors, the current policy framework 
has not resulted in ambitious actions. Therefore, mitigation 
efforts need to be greatly expanded so that effective carbon 
pricing increases several-fold and covers all the sectors. The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD 2018) reports that at the 30 EUR/t-CO2 level, there 
is a 69% coverage gap of market instruments. Though this is 
indicative only of market instruments, our findings hint that 
climate policy must be substantially strengthened in both 
breadth and depth.
In the real world, the government does not necessarily 
have to rely on explicit carbon pricing; it can invoke regula-
tions, research and demonstration, tax credits, subsidies, and 
information campaigns as implicit carbon pricing, though 
extremely stringent policies could be politically infeasible. 
As our models suggest, there are robust strategies that can 
be pursued by Japan, including energy efficiency improve-
ment, power sector decarbonization, electrification, and 
development of variable renewables. Although the govern-
ment is making significant efforts, these efforts must be fur-
ther accelerated by strengthening all the (effective) policy 
instruments, including energy efficiency standards, renew-
able energy auctions, and demonstration and diffusion of 
early-stage technologies.
As costs are dynamic, they should not be taken at their 
face value (Grubb et al. 2015; Nemet 2019). They can be 
considerably reduced by innovation. Given the scale of cost 
reduction required, however, broad innovation efforts must 
be markedly expanded. The first target should be VREs, as 
our analysis shows that halving the VRE costs does signifi-
cantly reduce the costs. It is no brainer since other countries 
have successfully slashed the costs (IRENA 2019; Shiraki 
et al. 2021). Japan needs to follow suit. Another key consid-
eration is the role of CCS and hydrogen. Models suggest that 
either CCS or hydrogen is required on a large scale, and yet 
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technology development remains at the level of demonstra-
tion projects. The government needs to strengthen market 
creation policies for these new technologies.
Nurturing innovation at such a grandiose scale is a huge 
challenge because of the fundamental uncertainty in innova-
tion and their interaction with other sources of uncertainty. 
Moreover, the role of the government in innovation is often 
indirect given the complexity of the national innovation sys-
tem; see Nemet (2019) for the case of solar photovoltaics. 
As seen in Figs. 6 and 7, models show divergent pathways 
for Japan’s energy system. Except for VREs, the role of 
individual technologies cannot be ascertained. Therefore, 
policymakers will have to employ adaptive management in 
recognition of contemporaneous technology progress. For 
instance, the current government pays significant attention to 
hydrogen as a clean energy carrier. The Tokyo 2020 Olym-
pic and Paralympic games that have been postponed (as of 
this writing) are going to feature hydrogen in the Olympic 
flame. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government is planning to 
introduce 50 fuel-cell buses (Tokyo Metropolitan Govern-
ment 2020). The government has an ambitious goal to slash 
the cost of hydrogen by approximately one-third to 30 JPY/
Nm3 by 2030s (Ministerial Council on Renewable Energy, 
Hydrogen and Related Issues 2017). Although these efforts 
are laudable, innovation targets are easy to miss; hydrogen 
may come but not at the desired time nor in the expected 
form. In fact, the energy mix presented in Figs. 6 and 7 
does not show a significant role of hydrogen in 2030. Even 
in 2050, only two models (IEEJ_Japan 2017 and TIME-
Japan) show some penetration. Policymakers should take 
into consideration the uncertainty of the future technology 
development.
In other words, the climate policy package must incor-
porate adaptive management as an essential element. In 
light of the updating mechanism under the Paris Agree-
ment, the Government of Japan should take full advantage 
of the opportunity to address uncertainties. This approach 
is already embedded in the Strategic Energy Plan, which 
focuses on multi-track scenarios. The details are yet to be 
fleshed out. However, in the medium term, there appears to 
be less flexibility. For instance, the NDC essentially stipu-
lates energy mix in the medium term. In the previous energy 
plans, the rule of nuclear power fluctuated greatly thanks to 
optimism, a nuclear disaster, and public perception, which 
affected the prospect of mitigation (Fig. 2). Our results 
demonstrate that there is no single energy future for Japan 
(Figs. 6, 7). Policymakers should embrace diverse possibili-
ties for 2030 as well as 2050 by incorporating flexibility into 
the policy framework.
Study limitations and future research agenda
Though this study covered multiple models and addressed 
many different sources of uncertainty, there are several limi-
tations to the present study.
First, there is an acute need for further model develop-
ment. The infeasibility of 90% emissions reduction in two 
models and 100% reduction in three models, and the carbon 
price levels exceeding the cost of carbon dioxide removal 
(Fuss et  al. 2018), imply that models must incorporate 
options, such as BECCS. The sensitivity analysis suggests 
the important role of industrial decarbonization (for mar-
ginal costs) and renewables (for total costs), and further 
improvement on these fronts would be crucial (Ju et al. 
2021; Shiraki et al. 2021). As there is a wide range reported 
in the literature (Matsuo et al. 2018), it would be illuminat-
ing to conduct an inter-comparison dedicated to renewables.
Second, in this paper, we have focused on the time hori-
zon of 2050. The 2050 net-zero emissions target emphasizes 
2050, but there is a need to analyze what happens after 2050. 
Thus, the model framework should be expanded. Some mod-
els already have this capability and conducted such an analy-
sis (Kato and Kurosawa 2019, 2021). This is an important 
research issue in the next iteration.
Third, we did not include global models (Oshiro et al. 
2019) or some notable models of Japan (Ozawa et al. 2021; 
Takeda and Arimura 2021). Most of the participating models 
are based on partial equilibrium concepts. The global models 
that include Japan as a distinct region do not necessarily 
represent Japan with the most up-to-date parameters. The 
Japanese research teams have advantages with data updating 
because of proximity and the language whereas global mod-
els have strengths in terms of comprehensiveness. Therefore, 
it is useful to compare global and national models in a more 
consistent manner. Although Oshiro et al. (2019) have con-
sidered only two models from Japan, their work is the first 
step in the right direction.
Fourth, we did not analyze all sources of uncertainties, 
nor did we analyze why models differ from each other. As of 
this writing, the COVID-19 pandemic crisis has had signifi-
cant impacts on final energy and  CO2 emissions as well as 
the possible future energy trajectories. All of our models and 
scenarios have missed it. More importantly, the effect of the 
base year should ideally be fully explored, but this aspect has 
not been analyzed. These issues are left for future research.
Fifth, the models did not represent any policy except for 
economy-wide carbon pricing. Some studies have begun 
work on this front (Roelfsema et al. 2020), and more realis-
tic representation of policies would be crucial in the future.
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